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THE DETERMINANTS OF LEBANESE ATTITUDES
TOWARD PALESTINIAN RESETTLEMENT:
AN ANALYSIS OF SURVEY DATA
Simon Haddad
Abstract
A principal goal of this study has been to assess the impact of social distance
on attitudes towards Palestinian resettlement using comprehensive crosscultural survey research. The results are clear and consistent for all
Lebanese sub-groups. Social distance is a significant predictor of attitudes
toward resettlement for all six sub-groups examined. Specifically, social
distance is inversely and consistently associated with unfavorable attitudes
toward the prospect of the permanent settlement of Palestinian refugees in
Lebanon. These findings indicate on one hand, that the majority of Sunnis
and Druze respondents endorse communal ties with Palestinians and
approve their permanent economic, social and political integration.
However, social distance influence political attitudes toward Palestinian
resettlement, namely in the case of Christian and Shii groups. Hence, for
most Lebanese the question is about their own political survival not
Palestinian resettlement If the actual perceptions stand, resettlement will
create a potential for communal conflict and will affect the social cohesion of
the society.
Introduction
After half a century in the shadows, the Palestinian refugee issue has
assumed a central place in the Arab-Israeli conflict with the initiation of the
Middle East peace process in 1991.Following the discussions in Madrid, it
has become clear that a satisfactory solution regarding the future of
Palestinian refugees residing in Arab host countries is imperative for a
durable peace in the Middle East. Pending a political solution that determines
their fate, more than five million Palestinians continue to be refugees in
various Arab countries. Although host population-refugee interaction vary
proportionally to rights and restrictions accorded to Palestinians, Palestinians
living in most parts of the Arab world have been considerably integrated
(Aruri and Farsoun 1981; Brand 1988; Davis 1996; Arneberg 1997).
An exception is Lebanon, which continues to be the most reluctant of hosts.
Lebanese officials seem concerned that Peace with Israel would eventually
lead to the permanent settlement of Palestinians in the country. They worry
that this cannot take place without further eroding the country’s precarious
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demographic composition. After two decades of civil war, Palestinian
presence has been the subject of much controversial debate ranging from
statements calling for their comprehensive deportation to more careful and
pragmatic propositions that they be granted civil rights and a more secure
form of permanent residence. And while almost all segments of societypoliticians, religious leaders, political parties and scholars- joined the
discussion, it is important to devote attention to public attitudes vis-à-vis the
Palestinians and the prospect of their permanent settlement in Lebanoni.
Debate regarding the fate of Palestinians residing in Lebanon resurfaced
with the confirmation in the Oslo Agreement that there is an agreement to
settle the Palestinians in the countries where they actually reside. If a solution
is reached regarding the Palestinians' presence, it will not provide for their
return. Lebanese positions range from statements calling for their wholesale
removal to more measured and accommodating suggestions that they be
granted civil rights and a more secure form of residency. Not only the
permanent settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon is outlawed under
Lebanon’s constitution, but also public statements by Lebanese officials
continue to itinerate a refusal to permanently integrate the refugees. Lebanese
President Emile Lahoud confirmed this point when addressing a conference
for Francophone countries in Canada that” all the Lebanese people agree that
the permanent settlement of the Palestinian refugees is a time
bomb”(Blanford 1999, p.18). Other examples of this common political
position are a remark by a prominent Shii Lebanese politician, Abdallah AlAmin (Al-Majallah 1995): "The talk about settling the Palestinians does not
concern us in any way. We say that the Palestinians must return to Palestine,
as we are unable to absorb or settle anyone." Former Minister of Education
Michel Eddeh (Al-Nahar November, 1999) concludes: " Lebanon refuses the
implantation of the Palestinians on its territories, since this foreshadows the
country's division." Sunni MP Ahmed Karami (Al-Nahar July, 1999)
expressed his categorical opposition “While the foreign media have been
suggesting that resettlement is going to be imposed on the Lebanese, we
think that the Lebanese people, because of their unity and solidarity, can stop
any resettlement plan”.
Although writings about Palestinian resettlement in Lebanon are numerous,
most of them tend to be first, very much descriptive or mainly concerned
about the refugees legal and socio-political standing (Salam 1994; Sayigh
1994; Arzt 1996; El-Khazen 1997). Second, only rarely are studies
nationwide and cross-cultural, with a concern of discovering what conditions
social and political relationships. Third, and perhaps most important, there
has been little research in which the individual Lebanese is the unit of
analysis, and accordingly very few systematic databased investigations that
focus on the link between the social and political orientations of ordinary
Lebanese citizens toward Palestinian presence (Khashan 1994; Haddad
2000).
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To these deficiencies may be added the dearth of information about the
relationship between social attitudes held by the Lebanese towards
Palestinians and their indefinite settlement in Lebanon. In order for
Palestinian resettlement to be feasible, there needs to be general consensus in
the country, including acceptance of various aspects and consequences of this
position among the different sectarian groups. In a multi-confessional state
that recognizes the primacy of religious communities, any decision or policy
must satisfy all communities to be workable. Second, there should be overall
low levels of intolerance for Palestinians in the population. In our view,
minimal social integration and weak inter-communal bonds between
Lebanese and Palestinian groups are a major obstacle to achieving
resettlement without disrupting peaceful coexistence in the country. These
two elements constitute a conceptualization of social distance that is
appropriate to the Lebanese. Accordingly, to contribute to an understanding
of whether and how social distance toward Palestinians influence the way
that ordinary Lebanese think about resettlement, this study uses crosssectional survey data from Lebanon to examine the degree to which social
distance account for variance in attitudes toward Palestinian resettlement in
Lebanon.
Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of the Study
a-Relevant Theoretical Considerations
Immigration, involving long-term relocations of people across national
borders, is a timely issue of sensible and academic importance. The act of
leaving one's native country and settling in another country has immediate
and long-term consequences for both immigrants and members of immigrantreceiving nations. Immigration presents a range of challenges, and the
challenge of managing immigration successfully--in ways that facilitate the
achievement and well being of immigrants, that benefit the country
collectively, and that produce the cooperation and support of members of the
receiving society--is critical for nations and individuals (Dovidio and Esses
2001). These issues have been framed academically largely in terms of
economics, politics, and resource management. As a consequence, they have
been studied extensively by economists, sociologists, political scientists,
demographers, historians, and geographers (e.g., Borjas 1999; Cohen &
Layton-Henry 1997; Hirschman, Kasinitz, & DeWind 1999; Rumbaut,
Foner, & Gold 1999).
While an estimated 80 million migrants, almost 2 percent of the world's
population, live permanently or for long periods of time outside their
countries of origin (Castles 1993, p. 18) in most cases, and even European
nations have seen harsh, often violent, reactions to these new minorities
(Pettigrew 1998, p. 77). As Solomos and Wrench (1993) indicate, "In many
societies in contemporary Europe, questions about migration and the position
of minorities are amongst the most hotly contested areas of social and
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political debate. Developments in Britain, France and Germany over the past
decade have highlighted the volatility of the phenomenon and the ease with
which it can lead to violent conflict" (p. 4). Even immigration that clearly
and objectively benefits a nation as a whole does not necessarily have the
same consequences for all segments of the population (Borjas 1999; Castells
1997). Immigration may thus be perceived as threatening and undesirable by
subsets of a population (Cohen 1997). Opposition to immigration may vary
systematically as a function of perceived competition across time and for
different segments of the receiving society (Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong
1998). Many continue to view the new minorities as not belonging - even the
growing numbers of the second- and third-generation who have lived only in
the host nation. They view the new minorities as "a people apart" who violate
traditional values and for whom they feel little sympathy or admiration and
tend to discriminate against them (MacEwen 1995). Discrimination comes
about only when individuals or groups are denied equal treatment (Allport
1954, p.51)
Both direct and indirect discrimination are involved (Pettigrew 1998, p.
79). Direct discrimination, where blatantly prejudiced people may oppose
immigration categorically, is straightforward and sets up spatial boundaries
of some sort to accentuate the disadvantage of immigrants. It occurs at points
where inequality is generated, often intentionally. That is when steps to
exclude members of a certain group from our neighborhood, school,
occupation or country are taken. A classical example is provided by surveys
of Black/White interracial contact in the United States. Scholars assert that
White acceptance of Blacks across a range of formal and informal settings.
Preferred social distance or pro-integration sentiments among Whites
measured their acceptance concerning bringing a Black person home for
dinner, allowing Blacks into the neighborhood, and permitting interracial
marriage (Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner 1996).
Indirect discrimination involves people with more subtle biases who may
oppose the immigration of certain groups of people (i.e., stigmatized racial or
ethnic groups) but justify their exclusion on the basis of reasons other than
prejudice, such as economic reasons (Pettigrew & Meertens 1995). It
operates when the inability to obtain citizenship restricts the opportunities of
non-EU minorities in most institutions. It restricts their ability to get suitable
housing, employment, and schooling for children. A visa is required for
travel to other EU countries. In short, the lives of non-citizens are severely
circumscribed (Wilpert 1993). Castles (1984) contends that the newcomers
are established as a problematic and stigmatized outgroup, suitable for lowstatus jobs but not for citizenship. Wilpert goes further. She asserts that
Germany's institutions are based on "a dominant ideology, which distributes
rights according to ethnic origins..." (Wilpert 1993, p. 70). The revealing
comparison is between the almost two million Aussiedler and the
Gastarbeiter. Officials regard the former as kin often on the thinnest of
evidence, though since 1996 a language test must be taken. Aussiedler

99
readily become citizens and receive favorable government treatment. Yet
even third-generation Turks, who are at least as culturally "German" as the
Aussiedler, are largely denied citizenship and given unfavorable treatment.
b-Obstacles to Palestinian Integration in Lebanon
There are no definitive figures concerning the number of Palestinians in
Lebanon today but estimates suggest that the actual size of the Palestinian
community is close or even 400 thousand or more than 10 percent of the
country’s populationii. Because of the lack of census data and civil status
records, political motives tend to distort accurate figures.
For the first few years following their arrival in 1948, Palestinians refugees
were given material and moral support, but since then their treatment has
deteriorated. Early governmental response was that the Palestinians are not
allowed to stay indefinitely in the country and Lebanese authorities refused
to discuss any solution that would open the door for the Palestinians to
become assimilated or naturalized. In fact, the Lebanese government has
made every effort to make life uncomfortable, and Lebanon unwelcoming,
for the Palestinian community (Natour 1996, p.60). This policy is practiced
consistently and with obsessive fervor to make sure that those Palestinians
wishing to remain in Lebanon are unable to do so, under unbearable
economic and political circumstances (Sayigh 2001).
Consequently, not only Palestinians were denied basic refugee or
immigrant rights (Westin 2001), but also they have been in most cases the
victim of official discrimination, social derogation and exclusion: First,
restrictions on political rights and naturalization have ensured that
Palestinians have been excluded from public institutions of social life and
from the legal rights and protections the state affords to its citizens.
Officially, the Palestinian community does not call for Lebanese citizenship,
but those who can acquire it do so. In the past several years, around 50,000
Palestinians have been naturalized in Lebanon. In 1994, citizenship has been
granted to another 27,000 who were mostly Shii residents of Southern border
villages who had Palestinian refugee status (Shaml 1997); the rest were
Sunnis who, for reasons not made public, were naturalized in 1995, perhaps
to balance out the Shii naturalization. Maronite protest ensured that the few
remaining Palestinian Christians without Lebanese citizenship were then
naturalized (Peteet 1999). In addition, travel restrictions on Palestinians were
always tight, passports rarely given, and the only documents issued by the
government were temporary. Accordingly, the greatest majority remains
stateless and is treated as foreigners, since Lebanese law prevents
Palestinians from buying propertyiii.
This leads us to the second type of governmental restraints, which has to
do with economic integration in the labor market. This is where Lebanese
and Palestinians meet, interact, and develop mutual interdependence.
Palestinians are classified as special case category foreigners along with Sri
Lankans, Thais, Filipinos, Kurds and Syrians, who together constitute
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Lebanon's imported working class. A harsh policy referred to as
“strangulation” of Palestinians is accomplished by extremely restrictive
options that provides for employment only by permit and the near-total
absence of social welfare provisions (Peteet 1997). Obtaining a work permit
remains a complex and lengthy process that offers neither social security nor
insurance benefits nor a regular wage increase, and becomes invalid when its
holder is laid off the job. Moreover, employment in large institutions is
largely closed to Palestinians because it is governed by sectarian rules.
Palestinians, however, explicitly are forbidden to work in virtualy more than
70 qualified professions such as medicine and law. These restrictions force
them to work in the informal sector with low wages, insecurity and no
benefits. On the other hand, and as a preventive measure to discourage them
from remaining in the country, official policy has made it difficult for the
younger generation to continue post-compulsory school studies, even if
international assistance has helped to provide secondary school places for
some. The normal public schools are closed to Palestinians, while private
schools charge fees that are often beyond their means (Hammarberg 2000).
Third, legally enforced segregation in housing ensures that not only are
Palestinians in Lebanon confined to well defined, circumscribed and
surveilled camps but they are also prevented from urgent reconstruction work
in the camps, which contribute to their insecurity. Restrictions on building
and reconstruction in the camps have resulted in severe overcrowding.
Refugees have been banned since 1992 from bringing in any kind of building
material into camps "Not even stones to cover our graves, says a camp
official” (The Economist 2000). Since the government did not show the
slightest interest in integrating the refugees, Lebanon remains the only host
country where the quota of camp inhabitants is still higher than 50 percent
Finally, and perhaps most important, Lebanese prejudice put into practice
receives additional evidence from Palestinians’ perceptions of their situation
in Lebanon. By definition, Palestinians are held in low regard by Lebanese
and are often subject of negative stereotypes, hatred and hostility.
Palestinians also recognized the differences between Lebanese and
Palestinians in social prestige and socio-economic conditions. According to
Peteet “there are several problems in distinguishing Palestinians from
Lebanese and confining them to homogeneous enclaves” (Peteet 1996, p.28).
However, until the late 1960s, the majority of Lebanese citizens did not
manifest blatant prejudice or outright rejection for Palestinian refugees who
came to Lebanon in 1948 and who share language and culture with their
Lebanese hosts. In fact, many Palestinians have formed strong social and
economic ties, through a long history of intermarriage and trade, to their host
country. According to one Lebanese official (Brynen 1997), for example,
fully one-quarter of third generation Palestinians in Lebanon has one
Lebanese parent.
Although, urban Palestinian camps, which were scattered allover Lebanese
territory had merged with surrounding Lebanese areas by the mid-seventies,
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Lebanon’s official policy contributed, through deliberate spatial containment,
to create and sharpen communal distinctions. During the 1950s, tight vigil by
the army curtailed movement for Palestinians. Later, with the dissolution of
state authority in the 1970s and 1980s, local Lebanese militias crafted and
imposed boundaries where a fluidity of space and social relations once
prevailed between Lebanese and Palestinians (Cutting 1988). In postwar
Lebanon, Palestinian refugees describe their lives in terms of abnormality.
Aside from shortages of shelter, food, safety and access to medical care and
education, they have constant doubts about the security of residence. In fact,
not only were Palestinians landscaped out of Palestine, but also the erasure
continues in exile. A Palestinian lawyer, echoing popular sentiment, has
written, " that there are those who believe that the group known as
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon will stop existing within a few years (AlNatour 1993, p.41).” The refugee experience did not include the usual
minority attributes of difference in language, religion and culture. Palestinian
marginality is contingent, to some extent, on the concept of a Lebanese
nation and society, however problematic, that excludes them. This negative
identity held by their hosts prompted some observers to characterize the
Lebanese society as minestrone rather than a melting pot, and encouraged the
Palestinians to stress their culture, tradition and own identity (Koltermann
1997).
c-Basic Views on Palestinian Resettlement
Despite growing opposition to Palestinian resettlement, many think that
Lebanon will have to face the reality of settling the Palestinians in it. Under
the best circumstances, it might be possible to ensure that 250,000 to 300,000
of them leave, but Lebanon will find itself compelled to absorb at least
100,000 of them (Abd-al-Samad 1995; Khoury 2000). At the same time,
there is very little support in Lebanon, at either the official or popular level,
for the permanent resettlement of a significant number of Palestinians. In
general, Lebanese authorities avoid raising this issue because it causes
internal divisions, not about the principle of rejecting the settlement of
Palestinians, but about the way in which this policy should be carried out.
Some people in Lebanon believe that the presence of the Palestinians in
Lebanon will created demographic, economic, social, and sectarian disorders.
More specifically, Lebanon’s opposition to resettlement rests on three major
perceived political and historical arguments (Solh 1999):
* Economic: Lebanon's geographical area is very small in relation to its
population. The Lebanese area that can be settled and exploited, after
eliminating the mountains and deep valleys, is very small. This makes it
unable to assimilate the Palestinian refugees, especially following the
devastation inflicted by the civil wariv. Former Minister Michel Edde adds
that it is “impossible” for Palestinian refugees to settle in Lebanon. “The
economic situation is very difficult and people are emigrating due to the high
rate of unemployment” (Daily Star, 30/12/2000).
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* Political and Historical: Granting the refugees sanctuary was undertaken
as a humane, emergency measure; it was never intended to be permanent, the
situation of the Palestinian refugees in the existing camps in Lebanon is
basically different from their situation in some Arab countries where they
live, work, and enjoy medical and educational security (Boueiz 1994). After
more than 50 years, Lebanese see themselves as having paid a much higher
price for the Palestinian cause than any other country. There are harsh
memories of the civil wars of the 1970s and 1980s in which the Palestinians
were blamed for dragging the country into bloodshed. Lebanese feel they
cannot be asked to pay more in the form of the consequences incumbent on
settling the Palestinians in Lebanon.
* Demographic: Lebanon is a multi-confessional country with seventeen
officially recognized sects. Lebanese belong to three main sects: Muslim,
Christian and Druze. The Lebanese sectarian structure is very delicate.
Palestinians citizenship would further skew the already shaky balance both
between Christians and Muslims, and between Sunni and Shia Muslimsv.
Any imbalance will have a political, social, economical, and security impact
on it. Ever since, Lebanon found himself host to a large and overwhelmingly
Muslim refugee population, the Christians anticipated that the largely
Muslim refugees might threaten their economic and political dominance, and
assumed demographic majority. They feared and still fear their presence
could upset the sectarian balance and political status quo by serving as a
focal point for the growing discontent of Lebanon's Muslims and their
eventual political mobilization for a greater share of power and national
resources. Lebanon’s Shiis concur; out of fear that Palestinians will tilt the
Muslim Lebanese balance in the wrong direction. (The Economist 1992,
p.45)
In fact the government still proclaimed the Palestinian refugees to
constitute the greatest menace to national security. In this context, the
immense number of mostly Muslim refugees was seen as highly explosive,
threatening to blow up the entire political system of their host country.
The intensity of anti-Palestinian feelings, judged by the intensity and
salience of hostile attitudes publicly expressed, prompted a journalist to
characterize Lebanese attitudes towards Palestinians as ranging between two
poles: indifference at one level and negativity at the other, with negativism
varying between active hostility and passive dislike (Zeine 1994).
Notwithstanding more concrete evidence are provided from cross sectional
surveys of Lebanese groups (Khashan 1994; Haddad 2000). Previous
research findings on the permanent settlement of Palestinian in Lebanon have
pointed out that attitudes expressed by the Lebanese have been found to be
highly non-supportive of resettlement, attitudes towards the Palestinians are
variable, but usually negative. However, the relationship between attitudes
towards the Palestinians as individuals or group and support for resettlement,
which is the focus of the present report, has not been examined.
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Methodology
In all, 1073 adult individuals, 688 male and 385 female respondents
responded to these questions. The survey was carried out in late December
1999 and January 2000, using a face-to-face interviewing procedure. The
response rate (based upon the number of completed interviews, as compared
with households contacted) was 80 percent.
The sample included five occupational sub-groups, selected on the basis of
quota sampling necessitated by the fact that representative selection is not
possible due to lack of accurate demographic data pertaining to the
characteristics and the urban distribution of the population. Because the
sample is non-probabilistic, it is important to describe its characteristics and
to note that, in some respects, they differ from those of the larger Lebanese
population over the age of 18.The sex distribution of the sample consisted of
64 percent male and 36 percent female. The lower proportion of women in
the study reflects their marginal position in the Lebanese society dominated
by males as well as their limited professional role. The sample had an age
range of 18-66 years and a mean age of 33 years. The representation of each
confessional group is, as close as possible, in proportion to its actual size in
Lebanon's population: 29 percent Maronites, 10 percent Greek-Catholics, 9
percent Greek-Orthodox, 27 percent Shi`is, 18 percent Sunnis, and 7 percent
Druze. In terms of educational level, the sample was found to be overrepresented in the college-educated level with 58 percent having achieved
college education. Less-educated Lebanese generally have a problem in
forming political opinions. In terms of occupational groupings the sample
somewhat over-represented people with professional and managerial
occupations, and underrepresented people in the trades and labor categoryvi.
Despite some limitations, including the non-representative composition and
the relatively small size of the sample, this data constitutes an empirical
foundation possessing considerable strength. First, the availability of opinion
data dealing with socio-political issues is itself a very notable strength
because surveys dealing with political attitudes are extremely rare in the
Arab world and also in Lebanon. Lebanese people in general are cooperative
but have deep concern about their security. They suspect that most of such
surveys are conducted to serve government objectives or a deceitful political
organization. In responding to questionnaires what they think or write could
be used against them. Second, the respondents were interviewed in an
atmosphere of strict confidentiality, and well-trained interviewers of the
same religious background interviewed the respondents in their native
language (Arabic). The author maintained close contact with the field
workers during the entire period of data collection and personally supervised
the stage of data processing (coding and entry), including tabular preparation
and presentation. Third, given the precarious nature of survey research in a
conflictual environment three reliability test measures were imposed on the
data: pre-testing, internal consistency and response bias. Consequently,
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proper additions, deletions, and adjustments were made on the final version.
In general, respondents attested that the questions were easily understood.
Survey Instrument
In developing the survey instrument, an initial pool of items was
constructed from two sources. Approximately half of the items were adapted
from existing instruments (Allport 1954; Khashan 1994; Bettancourt & Dorr
1998; Labianca et al. 1998; Tuch et al. 1999). The remaining items were
developed anew by the investigator. Many of the items adapted from
previous instruments were reworded to simplify their readability. Items were
selected or developed to assess social distance and attitude toward
resettlement, which represents the single dependent variable in this study.
English and Arabic language versions were prepared. A copy of the
interview schedule is available from the author.

Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations for Independent and
Dependent Variables by Religious Sect
Christian Groups
Maronites

ATR scaleª
SD scale°
Education
Income
Occupation

Mean
2.51
1.55
1.38
2.30
2.20

SD
0.69
0.80
0.61
0.59
0.51

Catholics
Coeff*
0.66
0.79

Mean
2.43
1.36
1.94
2.36
2.25

SD
0.75
0.34
0.94
0.54
0.55

Orthodox
Coeff*
0.68
0.81

Mean
2.27
1.43
1.65
2.20
2.13

SD
0.81
0.57
0.61
0.68
0.6

Coeff*
0.75
0.87

Muslim Groups
Sunnis

ATR scaleª
SD scale°
Education
Income
Occupation

Shi’is

Druze

Mean

SD

Coeff*

Mean

SD

Coeff*

Mean

SD

1.68
2.34
1.58
2.28
2.22

0.81
0.87
0.65
0.63
0.60

0 .78
0.83

2.23
1.96
1.68
2.44
2.45

0.79
0.91

0.67
0.82
0.70
0.53
0.55

1.75
2.31

0.75
0.86
1.42
2.21
2.10

Coeff
*
0.53
0.84
0.69
0.53

0.45
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Full Sample
ATR scaleª
SD scale°
Education
Income
Occupation

SD
0.82
0.91
0.65
0.58
0.56

Mean
2.21
1.87
1.50
2.32
2.26

Coeff*
0.75
0.86

N.B: ªAttitudes toward Resettlement
o Social Distance
*Cornbach’s Alpha coefficient
Independent Variable
The present analysis seeks to determine the role of social distance
established between Lebanese and Palestinians in accounting for variance in
attitudes toward Palestinian resettlement in Lebanon. A scale to determine
the level of social distance was constructed from seven items dealing with
views about preferred social distance between Lebanese and Palestinians.
Multi-reliability and factor analysis were employed to ascertain the unidimensionality of the scale. The survey items that cluster together are shown
in Table 2.
Table 2: Survey Items Used to Measure Social Distance towards Palestinians
1. Do you think that Lebanese and Palestinian students should go to same
schools or to separate schools?
2. How strong would you object or support if a member of your family had
close personal relation with Palestinians?
3. Do you think that there should be laws against marriage between Lebanese
and Palestinians?
4. How would you feel if a relative of yours was planning to marry a
Palestinian?
5. How would you feel if all your children’s’ schoolmates were Palestinians?
6.Would you accept to live in a neighborhood where the Palestinians are a
majority?
7.How willingly would you sympathize with Palestinians?

Table 2. Factor Analysis Scores for the Social Distance Items Using
Varimax Rotation (full sample)
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Item
Same or separate schools

Loading
0.76

Close personal relation

0.81

Laws against mixed marriage

0.60

Palestinian schoolmates

0.79

Palestinian neighborhood

0.72

Sympathize with Palestinians

0.71

Marry Palestinians

0.84

Social distance or views on integration of Palestinians is the primary
independent variable in this analysis. Nonetheless, whether it is related to
attitude toward Palestinian resettlement is to be determined. Although it
might be assumed that increased social distance implies opposition to
Palestinian resettlement, permitting differentiation between independent and
dependent variables, the actual situation is much more complex. Lebanese
officials have issued contradictory statements about whether the Lebanese
government will permit Palestinians to be fully integrated in the country, and
even theoreticians and politicians advance different views about whether
such integration is probable.
Bogardus introduced the Social Distance Scale for use as an index of the
social distance that respondents perceive between themselves and members
of different groups defined by nationality, ethnicity, religion, or politics. The
scale, or some form of it, has been used in studies involving a variety of
populations, including ethnic minorities (Bogardus 1925, 1967; Fagan &
O’Neill 1965; Payne et al. 1974; Kunz & Ohenebra-Saki 1989; Lambert &
Taylor 1990), and has been considered as a measure of prejudice. The survey
contained a battery of likert scale questions (responded to in terms of strong
agreement, agreement, etc.) tapping various aspects of the preferred social
distance between oneself or one’s family and Palestinians living in Lebanon.
Some items were phrased positively (i.e., indicating tolerance) and others
were phrased negatively (i.e., indicating prejudice). From seven of the
questions used in the survey, this scale which assesses respondents’
willingness to accept Palestinians in various roles (as a neighbor, friend, etc.)
was constructed and checked by various empirical analyses (internal
consistency of items in a scale, factor analysis of items, and scale intercorrelations). The sum score of the items divided by their number was taken
as an indication of negativeness or prejudice. The survey items that cluster
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together are shown in Table 2. Other independent variables are also included
in the analysis to assess the explanatory power of intense religiosity relative
to that of other factors. Linear regression is used to examine these
relationships, with the following independent variables included in the
model: education, income and SES.
2. The Dependent Variable
Table 3: Survey Items used to measure the Dependent Variable
1.If resettlement were imposed, would you accept it?
2.If Palestinian resettlement were imposed, would you actually try to resist it
militarily?
3.Do you think that Palestinian resettlement will lead to inter-group conflict?
4.Do you agree with the claim that Palestinian resettlement will result in the
resumption of the civil war?
5.Given your understanding of the Palestinian resettlement issue, would you
say resettlement would have negative repercussions on Lebanese society?
Factor Analysis Scores for the Attitudes towards
Resettlement Items Using Varimax Rotation
Item

Loading

Accept resettlement

0.76

Resist resettlement militarily

0.68

Resettlement will lead to conflict over allocation of power

0.69

Resettlement will result in the resumption of the civil war

0.66

Resettlement would have negative repercussions on Lebanese
society

0.73
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Table 4: Attitude Toward Palestinian Resettlement Scale by Religious Sect

Favors
resettlement
Somewhat
for
resettlement
Opposes
resettlement

Maronites

Catholics

Sunnis

Shi'is

Druze

Total

15

Greek
Orthodox
23

11

54

23

44

25

27

26

27

24

32

38

29

62

59

50

22

45

18

46

(*) The items listed in Table 3 have been combined to form a scale.
The dependent variable in this analysis is attitude toward Palestinian
resettlement. A scale composed on five inter-correlated items from the
survey instrument measures attitude. Table 3 lists the items used to construct
these measures, all of which deal with the respondents’ present position,
perceived impact, and reaction to Palestinian resettlement, Table 4 presents
the response distribution on these measures of the dependent variable.
Evidence in support of the validity and reliability of these measures comes
from several sources. Multi-reliability analysis revealed high inter-item
correlations and the reported Cornbach Alpha was equal to 0.86. Confidence
was further increased by the use of factor analysis; the five items load highly
on one factor demonstrating that these items cluster together and thus
measure the same underlying concept.
Analysis of The Findings
Table 1 presents the respondents mean ratings for all five independent and
dependent variables used in the study. In addition to highlighting the socioeconomic status for every sub-group (community), two important results are
generated. First, with regard to social distance, all three Christian groups,
joined by the Shiis, display higher levels of discrimination against
Palestinians compared to Sunnis and Druze. For instance, Christian groups
scores were 64 percent, 61 percent, and 60 percent respectively in contrast to
43 percent for the Shiis and 25 percent and 26 percent for the Druze on the
social distance scale. Second, in terms of the overall level of support for
Palestinian resettlement, the results indicated only moderate support among
Sunnis and Druze in sharp contrast to Christian and Shii clear opposition to
its prospect. These findings indicate that views of Lebanese communities are
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less divided between Christians and Muslims than within each of the subgroups. Thus, in order to answer the research question concerning the
independent relationship between the level of respondents’ social distance,
their demographic characteristics, and their attitudes toward Palestinian
resettlement, multiple regression analysis was employed. Table 5 presents
beta weights and t statistics between social distance, education, income and
SES and attitudes toward Palestinian resettlement. The results indicate that
social distance is significantly related to attitudes toward resettlement for all
sub-groups. Thus, the higher the respondents’ level of social distance, the
less the overall support given to resettlement. In other words respondents
from all sects are much less likely to support resettlement in Lebanon if they
contest future personal contact with Palestinians, whether civic, educational
or residential. Indeed, these relationships are always stronger than those
involving any other independent variable, i.e. educational attainment in the
case of the Sunnis and income level for the Shiis were found significantly
related to the criterion variable (p>0.05).
Table 5
Multiple Regression of Factors influencing Attitudes toward Palestinian
Resettlement in Lebanon
Maronites
(n=283)
Social
distance
Education
Income
SES
Constant
R²

-0.33
(-5.77)**
-0.11
(-1.89)
-0.09
(-1.52)
-0.02
(-.42)
34.81)**
0.11

Catholics

Sunnis

Shi'is

Druze

(n=83)

Greek
Orthodox
(n=83)

(n=158)

(n=226)

(n=68)

Full
Sample
(N=901)

-0.43
(-4.33)**
0.02
(0.17)
-0.14
(-1.38)
-0.13
(-1.27)
(19.52)**
0.19

0.49
(-5.05) **
-0.08
(-0.84)
-0.04
-(0.42)
- 0.06
(-0.60)
(17.65)**
0.24

--0.47
(-7.02)**
0.28
(4.10)**
0.06
(0.83)
0.00
(0.10)
(10.34)**
0.30

- 0.40
(-6.49)**
0.030
(0.467)
0.155
(2.55)*
- 0.82
(-1.04)
(9.30)**
0.17

-0.40
(-3.57)**
0.070
(0.62)
0.12
(1.09)
0.16
(1.39)
(10.67)**
0.16

-0.47
(-16.04)**
0.00
(0.26)
0.04
(1.46)
0.03
(1.07)
(54.61)**
0.22

NOTE: Table 5 shows standardized coefficients (betas) and gives t statistics
in parentheses *p<0.05;**p<0.01
Although part of these findings is to be expected- in the case of Christian
groups- those related to Muslim groups- are surprising and interesting. They
are also at variance with the arguments advanced by some scholars, to the
effect that Tawtin, or resettlement, is probably the only issue on which the
views of the Lebanese - across ideological and confessional lines - agree.
This argument is presented by El-Khazen (1997) who contends that
Palestinian presence, from being the most divisive issue in postindependence Lebanese politics is one of the few issues that arouse national
consensus in post-war Lebanon. A more plausible argument is offered by
Sayigh (2001) who asserts that Lebanese public can be divided into three
main segments: 1) a determined anti-Palestinian minority, 2) a large
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component who are indifferent to the Palestinian issue unless aroused by
sectarian campaigning, and 3) a minority that positively supports the
refugees.
Findings from the present study lend only partial support to these
arguments. Social distance defined in terms of degree of endorsement or
rejection of inter-communal -social, civic, residential, educational- ties with
Palestinians bears a significant relationship about attitude toward
resettlement. Intense anti-Palestinianism is discernible in the case of
Christian groups namely in statements like: "Usually, we don't care about
them. Sometimes we feel pity for them because they are poor. But we don't
think that they belong here” (Kolterman 1997, p.7). A reconstructive ethos
promoting "Lebanon for the Lebanese”, which has been carried by Lebanese
Christians throughout the civil war, is reiterated usually by Christian leaders
who tend to exaggerate the size of the Palestinian community and use the
question of resettlement to flourish their political vision of partitionvii.
Religious affinity plays a part in this extreme position since the Palestinian
refugee population is constituted as nearly all Muslim (Peteet 1997). Prior to
the 1975 civil war, in order to further a sectarian gloss to the refugee issue,
and in a demographic attempt to bolster the Christian population, the
Lebanese Government made available Lebanese citizenship to Palestinian
Christians. One of the major consequences of the Civil War was
Confessional “cleansing” of Palestinian refugee camps in Christiancontrolled areas to other parts of the country. Massive population shifts,
accompanied by the reintegration of displaced Palestinians into more
homogeneous, self-contained and exclusive spaces and the consequent
physical separations have confined Palestinian interaction to practically two
Lebanese groups, Sunni and Shii Muslims (Khashan 1992). However, a
highly significant negative relationship between social distance and attitude
toward resettlement emerges from the findings. Beyond political factors,
such as the deterioration of Palestinian-Lebanese relationship, heavy-handed
Israeli retaliation and PLO excesses, a set of economic asymmetries added to
Palestinian-Shii antagonism. Both communities lived side by side but the
Shii belonged to a lower low socio-economic spectrum. Underclass
resentment aroused because of the material advantage enjoyed by
Palestinians who were well established in Arab oil-producing states
projecting Palestinians as aliens, intruders and destroyers of our country
(Sayigh 1994). Referring to Palestinian misbehavior during their presence in
Lebanon, a Shii villager told Norton “ We gave Palestinians everything and
they gave us back insults, corpses, and lessons in corruption” (Norton 1987,
p. 12).
This negative position is extended only to a minority of Sunni respondents.
Khashan and Palmer (1981), who examined Sunni perceptions during the
Lebanese civil war, found out that the dominant position enjoyed by
Palestinians during that period, while not vociferously opposed by the
Sunnis, was complicated by the fact that Lebanese Sunnis generally accorded
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the Palestinian refugees an inferior social status. Thus, Palestinian-Lebanese
Sunnite affinity was partially eroded by military dominance of Palestinians
and by the reversal of status roles (Khashan & Palmer 1981). While part of
the Sunnis tends to distance themselves from Palestinians, this tendency is
stronger among less educated Sunnis than among their college-educated
counterparts. Indeed this result is striking since the integration of refugees is
supposed to take place, according to experts, within their sub-community.
However, this finding is in line with the position adopted by most Sunni
politicians. In 1990, even the Sunni Muslim leaders-who theoretically had
most to gain from the assimilation of the Sunni Palestinians into Lebanese
society- refused to welcome the Palestinians. This ultimately led to the
unexpected amendment to the constitution refusing non-Lebanese permanent
residence in the country. Later, Sunni prime Prime Minister Rafic al-Hariri
explicitly uttered, "Lebanon will never, ever integrate Palestinians. They will
not receive civic or economic rights or even work permits. Integration would
take the Palestinians off the shoulders of the international agency that has
supported them since 1948" (Cooley 1999, p.1)
Experiences of Palestinian marginality in interacting with Lebanese are
illustrated by Sayigh ”Palestinian refugees have been pathologized in a
manner reminiscent of turn-of-the-century American hyperbole that
immigrants carried tuberculosis, and more recent fears of immigrants as
carriers of the AIDS virus. Pathology demands quarantine: segregating
Palestinians would facilitate the "normalization" of Lebanon in the post-war
era with national health restored through the isolation of an infectious
presence” (Sayigh 1996, p. 28).
Pro-Palestinian voices present a weak minority in favor of resettlement. A
housing project submitted by the Canadian government to help provide a
certain measure of relief to the homeless refugees through the construction of
new barracks outside Beirut was supported in 1994, by Walid Jumblatt,
Minister for Refugees and leader of the Druze community. However, the
media leaked the talks and the violent protests that ensued led to the
abandonment of the entire project. This was a symptom of the fact that any
initiative that can be interpreted as indirect assent to the Palestinians
remaining is interpreted as a confessionalistic move. The Druze minority was
mainly interested in a buffer zone of loyal Palestinians between them and the
expanding Shi'a population. This is a clear indicator of expressed social
desirability of Palestinians by a large segment of the Druze community.
The findings of the present study indicated that social distance was a
significant predictor variable for all sub-groups-and the only predictor for
most of them, i.e. Christians and Druze. According to this concept, not only
does an observer interpret a group or member of a group erroneously, he or
she concludes that it he is inferior and therefore unwanted. This tendency for
outgroups rejection and hostility is clearly reflected in the study’s findings
that a high rating of social distance is related to the rejection of Palestinian
permanent settlement in Lebanon. Specifically, the study’s findings indicated
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that respondents who tend to score highly on the social distance scale
believed that resettlement will have damaging repercussions on the country,
and are therefore more likely to resist it.
To conclude, some brief observations pertaining to other independent
variables may be offered. Findings about these variables are not always
consistent and are, in any event of secondary importance to the present study.
In his attempt to determine the correlates of multiculturalism in Australia,
Robert Ho (1990) found that ethnocentrism was the only significant
predictor, but none of the demographic variables, for respondents’ attitudes
toward multiculturalism. In fact, respondents’ education, income, and SES
level were, in most cases, unimportant predictors of attitudes toward
resettlement. Nevertheless, there are several interesting relationships, some
of which identify promising areas for future research. To begin, the absence
of any significant relationship involving SES deserves mention. It delineates
the failure of the analysis to control for other meaningful factors, most
notably the respondents’ level of economic security and the perceived effect
of immigration on employment opportunities. In multicultural Canada,
economic concerns and worries have been assigned a more important role
than intolerance in determining the attitude toward immigration.
Furthermore, because Lebanon suffers from economic stagnation at the
moment, it may be hypothesized that perceived economic insecurity would
have pushed towards opposition to resettlementviii. This proposition, which
deserves future study, is consistent with findings about determinants of
political attitudes toward immigration in Western countries. In his survey of
Canadian attitudes toward immigration, Tienhaara (1974) found that
opposition to immigration was greater during recession and attributed most
to unemployment concerns. This point receives support from a recent
investigation that brought similar results using survey data in many studies
on immigration and attitudes towards immigrants (Palmer 1996). The
economic dimension is particularly worthy of examination as Lebanon may
be expected to accept permanent settlement of refugees induced by a
tremendous aid/development package. If economic conditions improve as a
result of Palestinian resettlement, would this reduce social distance and hence
opposition for resettlement? Coupled with the present study’s findings that
social distance account for variance in Lebanese attitudes toward Palestinian
resettlement, this suggests that a multi-factor model, including other
variables pertaining to the Lebanese situation have a much larger effect on
attitudes toward resettlement than do the respondents’ self-interest measures.
Conclusion
A principal goal of this study has been to assess the impact of social
distance on attitudes towards Palestinian resettlement using cross-sectional
survey research. The results are clear and consistent for all Lebanese subgroups. Social distance is a significant predictor of attitudes toward
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resettlement for all six sub-groups examined. Specifically, social distance is
inversely and consistently associated with unfavorable attitudes toward the
prospect of the permanent settlement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.
These findings indicate that, although social distance influence political
attitudes toward Palestinian resettlement-a conclusion that is hardly
surprising for Christian and Shii groups- the majority of Sunnis and Druze
respondent endorse communal ties with Palestinians and approve their
permanent economic, social and political integration. They also suggest a
more focused conclusion about the kind of social factors most likely to have
explanatory power. Judgments about the perceived consequences and to
economic needs in particular appear to be important in determining the
attitude toward resettlement. This proposition, which receives support from
findings about the importance of nature of perception of immigration on
economic status, offers a promising area for future research.
Keeping in mind that the nature of the sample employed in the present
study may limit the generalizability of the obtained results, the overall
findings carry a number of implications for the issues raised on the current
debate over Palestinian permanent settlement in Lebanon and also for the
Lebanese system as a whole. How genuine are Lebanese fears about
resettlement? Palestinian otherness is juxtaposed not to a homogeneous
singular category of Lebanese, but to a shifting set of sectarian groups and
alliances, each with particular interests and fears. A majority of Christian and
Shii respondents display intense prejudice towards Palestinians suggesting
the presence of social barriers that hinders socio-economic integration of
camp inhabitants and their children. On the other hand, the results suggest
the presence of a structural weakness in the Lebanese system. Lebanese
scholar Joseph Maila (2000) concedes that the permanent settlement of the
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, the vast majorities of whom are Sunni
Muslim, could be fatal to Lebanon’s delicate social mosaic. The Palestinians
could turn into an autonomous community, a development unprecedented in
Lebanon. The kind of linkage between these Palestinians and the Palestinian
Authority is likely to create tremendous problems for the Lebanese in the
coming yearsix. Hence, for most Lebanese the question is about their own
political survival not Palestinian resettlement. These negative attitudes,
coupled with further government restrictions and pressures on Palestinians,
imply that permanent settlement is a dangerous alternative that threatens the
regime with collapse. If the actual perceptions stand, resettlement will create
a potential for communal conflict and will affect the social cohesion of the
society. In connection with this, the Lebanese government finds itself
compelled to consent to continued Palestinian military presence in refugee
camps, which threatens to return to the situation of 20 years ago by
reenacting the civil war. Refugees in Palestinian camps have grown
increasingly restive over the course of the uprising. Lebanese authorities are
discounting fears that the fighting in the Palestinian territories could spark a
series of organized cross-border attacks into Israel from south Lebanon.

114
Whereas, Muslim clerics have been calling for active support to liberate
Palestine, Christians responded by condemning “the voices announcing their
intentions to violate Lebanese laws and attempt to go back to a past the
Lebanese want to forget (Daily Star 7/10/2000).
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Endnotes
i

In addition to increased attention to the Palestinian refugee question in
Lebanon, a conference on Palestinian Resettlement were upheld in 1999,”
Lebanese Identity: Between Naturalization and Implantation,” at the
University of Saint Esprit, Kaslik, on November 11 and academic workshop
entitled” Opposing Resettlement” at The Saint Joseph University organized
by Research Center for Arab Law, Beirut on November 26 grouping
prominent Lebanese figures and even the prime minister. This trend received
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additional support with the announcement that Lebanese clerics of all sects
intended to hold conference to take a harsh stance on the matter on July 29.
ii

See Palestinians in Lebanon, Report on the Conference Held at Oxford,
September 27th to 30th, 1996 (Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies, 1996),
p. 10. More recently Maronite deputy Naamatullah Abi-Nasr, former
president of the Maronite League, offered a figure of 12 percent compared to
other Arab host countries where Palestinian represent 1 percent of the
population in the United Arab Emirates and only 0.1 percent in Egypt and in
Saudi-Arabia during a conference entitled” Lebanese Identity: Between
Naturalization and Implantation," attended by the author on Palestinian
Resettlement at the University of Saint Esprit, Kaslik, Lebanon, on
November 26, 1999 .
iii

Recently Lebanese Parliament approved revisions to Law 11614 (1969)
concerning ownership of real estate by foreigners, forbidding "anyone who
does not have citizenship in a recognized state (Palestinians)" from owning
property, text published by al-Safir, 23 March, 2001).

iv

This could mean that 40 to 45 percent of total Lebanese territory cannot be
exploited and may result in increasing the population density to reach
632/km². This is a huge figure compared to other countries like Irak 47/km²
and Australia 2/km².

v

Though Lebanon’s constitution allocates public offices on the basis of a
50:50 ratio of Christians vs. Muslims, it is commonly accepted that the
Muslims constitute a majority in the country.

vi

The author sought to broaden the representativeness of the sample by
including 20 professions which were regrouped into five sub-groups for
reasons of data manageability: 19 percent professionals, 40 percent semiprofessionals, 11 percent unskilled, 25 percent college students (selected
from three private academic institutions: Notre-Dame University and
Lebanese University, and the American University of Beirut) and 5 percent
unemployed.
vii

Maronite politicians such as Michel Edde and Naamatulah Abi-Nasr have
brought the number of Palestinians in Lebanon to 500,000 and 600,000
respectively stressing that resettling them means partitioning the country.
viii

This dimension receives additional support knowing that that
unemployment in Lebanon is said to have exceeded 27 percent and that the
demographic composition of the Lebanese society includes a formidable
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percentage of 31 percent of foreigners (source Debate regarding Palestinian
Presence in Lebanon MTV Television. Beirut, 11 November 1999).
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